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Sartre’s Theory of Temporality in Being and Nothingness in Anglo-American Academic Discourse

Abstract

The study “Sartre’s Theory of Temporality in Being and Nothingness in Anglo-American Academic Discourse” presents in some detail Sartre’s ideas of time in his magnum opus Being and Nothingness (L’Être et le néant, 1943). The topic is dictated by the fact that these ideas have not been fully discussed by original philosophical literature in Anglo-American academia (English translations from French are not considered). The essay details three topics. The first, introductory part outlines the way Sartre’s theory of temporality in Being and Nothingness has or, rather, has not been fully analyzed in the specialized and popular philosophical literature in English. The overview covers some 65 titles on Sartre, existentialism, and phenomenology. The second section delineates Sartre’s theory of temporality in Being and Nothingness. The final part speaks of Sartre’s ideas of time in his literary criticism, namely, in his essay “On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the Work of Faulkner.”

Key words: Jean-Paul Sartre; time; Being and Nothingness; L’Être et le néant; existentialism; phenomenology; Sartre in Anglo-American academia; critical theory

Теорията на Сартр за времето в Битие и нищо в англо-американская академична литература

Резюме

Студията „Теорията на Сартр за времето в Битие и нищо в англо-американская академична литература” представя подробно идеите на Сартр за темпоралността в неговия magnum opus Битие и нищо (L’Être et le néant, 1943). Темата на изследването е продиктувана от факта, че тези идеи не са били детайлно обсъждани в оригиналната философска литература сред англо-американската академична общност (студията не се занимава с френски публикации, преведени на английски език). Изследването се състои от три части. Първият дял е уводен и очертава начина, по който теорията на Сартр за времето е била или, по-точно, не е била анализирана пълно в специализираната и по-популярната философска литература на английски език. Този обзор представлява около 60 заглавия върху Сартр, екзистенциализъм и феноменологията. Втората част представя теорията на Сартр за времето в Битие и нищо. Последният дял се занимава с идеи на Сартр за времето, отразени в неговата литературна критика и по-точно в статията му „За Врява и безумство: времето в творчеството на Фокър”.

Ключови думи: Жан-Пол Сартр, време, Битие и нищо, L’Être et le néant, екзистенциализъм, феноменология, Сартр в англо-американская академична литература, културна теория

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Phenomenology is hardly one of the leading philosophical movements in the United States, any more than it is in Britain.

Herbert Spiegelberg

Sartre and His English-Speaking Commentators

Some students of Sartre hold, and with good reason, that in English-speaking countries, due to the delay in the translation of Sartre’s works, “the judgments of his thought or actions have often been outdated or irrelevant” (Thompson and Thompson xii). Others are of the opposite opinion: “The hectic reaction [to Sartre’s philosophical works] is a matter of the past. Hectic as it was, this reaction was prompted only to a small degree by the theoretical writings. […] Thus, as an object for philosophical examination, Sartre seems by no means exhausted” (Hartmann xiii). In my overview of how Sartre’s theory of time in *Being and Nothingness* (*L’Être et le néant*, 1943; hereafter referred to as *BN* or only the page) has been presented in Anglo-American academic discourse I side with the latter group of Sartre scholars, though these words were written some more than fifty years ago. Serious philosophical thinking--in Sartre’s day and today--is at the same time re-thinking.¹ The theory of phenomenological temporality, as Paul Ricoeur reminds us, has a long history² and his work *Time and Narrative* is a brilliant example of how thinking of time is at the same time re-thinking of time (cf. Nankov).

The central topic of this paper is the theory of temporality in Sartre’s chief phenomenological work *BN*. I do not deal with the structural place and meaning of Sartre’s theory of time in the plan of *BN* as a whole,³ but concentrate on the theory itself. Still, generally speaking, the theory of temporality is part of the theory of the for-itself. “The For-itself rising into being as the nihilation of the In-itself constitutes itself simultaneously in all the possible dimensions of nihilation” (136). Temporality is one such form or dimension--along with reflection, transcendence, being-in-the-world, and being-for-others--or, as Sartre puts it, “the For-itself can not be except in temporal form” (136).

The English-speaking commentators of Sartre (I do not deal with writings on this thinker translated from French), if they deal with his temporal theory at all, expose it in a way that, for different reasons, often seems to go astray from what Sartre himself writes. My purpose, therefore, is to delineate the theory as clearly as possible (though the combination of clarity and *BN* often seems to be a contradiction in terms) and, as a part of this project, also to give an idea how some of Sartre scholars have written about this theory.⁴ I try to follow Sartre’s logic and let him speak by means of what I think are revealing passages from his work, rather than to provide paraphrases of his ideas without respecting what he himself writes. Such a procedure is encouraged by *BN* itself, which, as a phenomenological work, tends to describe, rather than to define its object of study. By letting Sartre
speak for himself, I keep up with the principle of description and evade, as far as possible, the principle of (re)definition.

As a rule, the theme of temporality is not touched upon in the popular writings on Sartre’s philosophy in English even in the cases when they deal with BN. The topic of temporality is not to be found, for instance, in Norman N. Greene’s book *Jean-Paul Sartre: The Existentialist Ethic* and Maurice William Cranston’s works *Jean-Paul Sartre* and *The Quintessence of Sartrism*. It, as well, does not seem to attract the attention of many of the serious English-speaking students of Sartre in their expository works on BN and Sartre’s philosophy in general. The reason for the skipping of Sartre’s theory of temporality, or presenting it inadequately, is hardly the delay of Sartre’s translations into English. For, in the case that one believes this, it should be asked what the reason for the delay itself is. A more plausible explanation of this neglect could be the fact that in the English-speaking countries, due to the influence of analytic philosophy whose major contributions have been epistemological and methodological, rather than ontological or transcendental, certain trends in German philosophy--systematic thinking and phenomenology among them--are (still) poorly known, underestimated, and one-sidedly criticized. And, as it is well known, in BN Sartre is a systematic philosopher in the French-German tradition who critically draws on Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel.

Before approaching the topic of time it will not be inappropriate to make some preliminary remarks concerning the readability of BN in general. These remarks, to a certain extent, explain the character of my presentation of Sartre’s ideas of temporality. On the other hand, these notes shed light on how the English-speaking students of Sartre interpret him. At this point I make an early conclusion that the rest of this essay will support: this, that makes Sartre’s philosophy difficult, is that, that makes his philosophy.

1. BN addresses a narrow philosophical community acquainted with the issues discussed. This, as it has been pointed out time and again, makes the work difficult to understand even by philosophers who are not thoroughly familiar with phenomenology (Spiegelberg, 2nd ed. 2: 447-48; and Catalano xi). This is particularly true for the Introduction, Part One, and Part Two of BN. Part Three and Part Four of the book are more accessible and this is the main reason why they are the most widely read and commented on parts of the work. After the initial wave of expository writings on Sartre, approximately from the mid1970s onward, things are changing. More recent scholarship in English demonstrates far greater interest in Sartre’s ethics, moral psychology (see Jopling), the relation of the self with the other(s) (see Schroeder; Busch, *The Power of Consciousness*; and Charmé), and his sociology (see Hayim; Craib; and Stack). This shift also means that more interpretative attention is
being allotted to the Third and Fourth Part of BN. These newer trends in Sartrean scholarship, on the other hand, mitigate BN with Sartre’s later works and his less well known works in general.

2. Sartre, in BN (and not solely there), emulates the difficult idiom of the German metaphysical philosophers. Simone de Beauvoir writes of Sartre as a boy: “He was particularly happy when he could not understand what he was writing” (quoted in Spiegelberg, 2nd ed. 2: 447 n. 1). The boyish happiness seems to persist in Sartre’s mature years as well, and this often throws his Anglo-American commentators into fear and trembling.12

3. In BN, Sartre changes his terminology from part to part. In Part One, for instance, for ontologically motivated reasons, the concept of Nothingness takes the place of the more familiar phenomenological concept of consciousness from the Introduction.13

4. Sometimes Sartre promises to develop in detail some of his ideas which he initially only sketches, but does not keep his word. Perhaps the most well known example is the promise from the Conclusion for a separate work on ethics that will investigate the ethical implications of BN.14 This work, as we know, never appeared.

5. Certain passages of BN are inconsistent, unclear, ambiguous, carelessly written, and thus difficult to understand.15

6. Sartre is a remarkable stylist and often tends to sacrifice philosophical meaning to rhetorical brilliance--his paradoxical aphorisms are a good example of this.16 In this sense, Sartre’s philosophical style as a language construct could be a separate topic for study.17 Some commentators neutralize Sartre’s verbosity by simply reducing and (over)simplifying his philosophical discourse.18 It is worthwhile asking the question, however, whether such a reduction is true to Sartre’s--and Husserl’s--basic idea that phenomenology is not deduction but description, and as such presupposes wide use of concrete examples.19

7. In contrast to what has been stated in 6, it could be asked how Sartre’s numerous concrete examples (phenomenological descriptions) could be a supportive part in a highly abstract ontological system, or, to put it differently, whether there is an intermediary between the concrete particularity of the examples and illustrations and the abstract universality of philosophical thinking.20

8. In BN, Sartre constantly returns to ideas and topics that he has already discussed, but in a different context and with different meaning.21

9. Sartre often uses similar terms with different meanings or, conversely, equates the meanings of different terms. This fluctuation and ambiguity make following him sometimes embarrassing.22 Another terminological problem is that Sartre, as is common in philosophy, borrows terms from other
philosophers, but redefines their meaning. He also presents well-known ideas in the guise of new terminology (Hartmann 58-59, 58 n. 67; Naess 281; and Jones 439).

10. Part of the problems of understanding Sartre comes from the difficulties and inevitable differences in translating him. Each translation (which, in reality, exteriorizes the translator’s understanding of the work) potentially leads the interpretation in a different direction.

11. Last but not least, the quest for philosophical precision sometimes violates language, and culminates in coinages such as the famous terms néantir, néantisation, and négatité (Naess 300; Barnes, Sartre 52; and Fry 51 n. 38); or in turning of the verb exister into a transitive verb in the phrase existe son corps (Part Three, Chapter 2) (Catalano 174; and Fry 11 n. 27); or in the use of the term l’être-en-soi whose precision results from its use in a philosophical tradition (Hegel’s Logic), but which is logically contradictory; or in auxiliary signs for allegedly more precise meaning, as in the case of conscience de soi (reflective consciousness) and conscience (de) soi (pre-reflective consciousness) (Barnes, Sartre 57; Catalano 32-33).

Sartre’s Theory of Temporality in Being and Nothingness

Sartre’s theory of temporality is developed in Part Two, Chapter Two of BN. Sartre speaks of time in other parts of BN as well (see 204-16, 496-504). His analysis is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to “pre-ontological, phenomenological description” (107) of the three dimensions of time (107-29); the second part deals with the ontological description of static and dynamic temporality (130-49); and the third part is devoted to reflection as it relates to original temporality and psychic temporality (150-70).

1. Phenomenology of the three temporal dimensions. For Sartre, temporality is not a collection of “givens,” a series of “nows,” but “an organized structure,” “the structured moments of an original synthesis” (107), a “totality” (110) which is built up of the three temporal dimensions—the past, the present, and the future. Time as totality is a basic idea that guides Sartre’s whole investigation of temporality.

1.1. The Past. The analysis of the past opens with criticism of two groups of theories that Sartre repudiates because they cut off the bridges between the past and the present (109-10) and thus, as one could infer, make the unity of time impossible. According to the first (Descartes), the past has no being, it “is no longer,” “everything is present” (108). According to the second (Bergson, Husserl), the past is thought of “as losing its efficacy without losing its being” (109). The error of these two groups of theories, concludes Sartre, is that they consider the consciousness as the in-itself, i.e., “as being what it is” (110).
The “ontological relation which unites the past to the present” is the notion of “‘myness,’” that is to say the idea “that ‘my’ past is first of all mine” (110). The reconnection between the past and the present is possible if we think that my past of yesterday exists “as a transcendence behind my present of today” (111). Sartre illustrates his approach with an example of Paul who is now forty and who was a student at the Polytechnique: “the past itself is in the sense that at present it is the past of Paul or of his Erlebnis. [. . .] The past is characterized as the past of something or of somebody; one has a past. [. . .] There is not first a universal past which would later be particularized in concrete pasts. On the contrary, it is particular pasts which we discover first. The true problem [. . .] will be to find out by what process these individual pasts can be united so as to form the past” (111-12). In the case of a dead person, it is the survivor in his freedom who is responsible for the past. The dead do not have past; they “along with their pasts are annihilated” (112). On his way to internal relation between the past and the present, Sartre first rejects the external relation between them: “the past can not be possessed by a present being which remains strictly external to it” (112). This external relation is expressed by “‘to have’ a past” (112), and implies a mode of possession where the possessor is passive (113). This relation is reached “if we study the relations of the past to the present in terms of the past” (113).

The internal relation of the past and the present, on the other hand, is expressed by “‘to be’ its own past” (114). “There is a past only for a present which cannot exist without being its past—back there, behind itself; that is, only those beings have a past which are such that in their being, their past being is in question, those beings who have to be their past” (114). Sartre, therefore, a priori rejects granting a past to the in-itself (114). If, thinks Sartre, we could prove that living matter is something other than a physical-chemical matter, we could grant a past to life (BN 114). He, however, does not deal with the proof and immediately confers a past to human reality. The past could be only human: “For Human Reality alone the existence of a past is manifest because it has been established that human reality has to be what it is. It is through the for-itself that the past arrives in the world because its ‘I am’ is in the form of an I am me” (114). After Sartre has explained in what sense human reality, the for-itself, is its past, he, to the end of the section devoted to the past, analyzes in what sense the for-itself was its past (114-20). In my opinion, the paradox that the for-itself at the same time is and was its past is explained by means of the nonidentity of the for-itself with itself.

According to Sartre, the present is the past. “The present being therefore is the foundation of its own past; and it is the present’s character as a foundation which the ‘was’ manifests. [. . .] ‘Was’ means that the present being has to be in its being the foundation of its past while being itself its past” (114). Sartre outlines the ontology of the past by analysis of “was.” “Was” mediates between the present and the past without being either wholly present, or wholly past. “The term ‘was’ indicates the
ontological leap from the present into the past and represents an original synthesis of these two temporal modes” (114).

Before explaining what this synthesis is, Sartre explains what it is not. (From Sartre’s text, however, it is not easy to distinguish between what the synthesis is and what it is not. My presentation of this point, therefore, follows the logic of the text and not its linear arrangement.) First, it is not death because at the moment of death our present slips entirely into our past and we, the for-itself, are turned into an in-itself, i.e., death is the moment when we become identical with ourselves and are no more responsible for our past (115). “By death the for-itself is changed forever into an in-itself in that it has slipped entirely into the past. Thus the past is the ever growing totality of the in-itself which we are” (115). Second, the synthesis is not the past as that which is opposite to my possibles, because the past has consumed its possibilities. I assume the responsibility of this past, I can change its meaning in accordance with my future project (cf. 496-504), but I cannot add or remove anything from its content. The past without possibilities is identical with itself; it is being in-itself (116). Third, the synthesis, i.e., the fact that I am not my own past, is not in the mode of becoming that is understood as change of my being. Becoming is an external bond between being and non-being, whereas Sartre is interested in an internal bond between them: “The bond between being and non-being can be only internal. It is within being qua being that non-being must arise, and within non-being that being must spring up [. . .]” (117).

The synthesis, finally, means that “it is because I am my past that it enters into the world” (115). On the other hand, I am not my past. “I am not it because I was it” (116).

Now Sartre asks the question in what specific way the for-itself “was” its own past. Since the past is “in-itself,” “substance” (119), it relates to the for-itself as facticity. “This contingency of the for-itself, this weight surpassed and preserved in the very surpassing--this is Facticity. But it is also the past. ‘Facticity’ and ‘Past’ are two words to indicate one and the same thing” (118). On the other hand, “the past, which is at the same time for-itself and in-itself” (119), that is, the past as synthesis, resembles value but is not value; rather it is “value reversed” (120). In value “the for-itself becomes itself by surpassing and by founding its being” (119). Conversely, the past is from the start in-itself (119-20). (Sartre’s logic here is ambiguous: the past as a synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself is only in-itself, i.e., not a synthesis.)

1. 2. The Present. While the past is in-itself, the present is for-itself (120). The paradox of the present is that, on the one hand, it has being, it is--contrary to the past and the future which are no more and not yet. On the other hand, however, the present, severed from the past and the future, is not.
In his search for the being of the present, Sartre first points out that the fundamental meaning of the present is presence. “Present is opposed to absent as well to past. Thus the meaning of present is presence to ---” (121). Now Sartre asks two related questions: 1) who or what present is, and 2) to what the present is presence. His answer to the first question is: the for-itself. His answer to the second question is: to the in-itself. Sartre writes: “the For-itself is presence to all of being-in-itself” (121). The present, therefore, like the past, can only be human; the for-itself brings the present into the world. “But the For-itself is the being by which the present enters into the world; the beings of the world are co-present, in fact, just in so far as one and the same for-itself is at the same time present to all of them” (122). The present of the in-itself is, in reality, its co-presence with the for-itself as the for-itself is present to the in-itself (122). The relation of presence to --- is an internal one. It also is “an ontological relation of synthesis” (121), which means that the for-itself being present to --- is not being this to which it is being present to. Presence is also an ontological structure of the for-itself: “The For-itself is defined as presence to being” (121). What is presence, asks Sartre. It is not the external co-existence of two existents (beings-for-itself) because this would presuppose the existence of a third term (God) that has to establish the co-existence. But to establish means that this co-existence, or presence, already is, i.e., the presence would be in the mode of an in-itself which, as we have seen, is impossible. Sartre tackles this vicious circularity by pointing out that the for-itself is its own witness of its co-existence with the in-itself. This co-existence, or presence, is intentional and internal relation without being identification. The internal bond is negative; if it were not negative, the for-itself would have identified with itself, which is, in principle, not possible. “Thus the For-itself’s Presence to being implies that the For-itself is a witness of itself in the presence of being as not being that being: presence to being is the presence of the For-itself in so far as the For-itself is not” (122). Sartre concludes: “the Present is not” (122), and this is its fundamental meaning (123). The meaning of the non-being of the present and the for-itself is explained by the ontological relation of the for-itself to being, which is “not being” but “consciousness of --- as the internal negation of ---. The structure at the basis of intentionality and of selfness is the negation, which is the internal relation of the For-itself to the thing. [. . .] The present is precisely this negation of being, this escape from being inasmuch as being is there as that from which one escapes” (123). Therefore, the present is not an instant, for the instant is the moment when the present is, while we already know that the present is not. The present is the for-itself’s non-being will be present. If the for-itself is outside of itself, it is before and behind. “Behind, it was its past; and before, it will be its future. [. . .] At present it [the for-itself] is not what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future)” (123). Sartre’s reader could infer that this formula expresses the unity or the totality of temporality.
1. 3. The Future. The in-itself cannot be future or contain a part of it. Like the past and the present, it is only by human reality, by the for-itself, that the future enters the world (124). “The future is what I have to be in so far as I can not be it” (125).

But what is the being of the future? Again Sartre starts with negative definitions; that is to say he rejects what the future is not. His general reason for the negations seems to be that, if we accept them, the future would turn into an isolated identity, and there would be no unity or totality of the temporal dimensions. First, the future does not exist as representation in the imagination as the psychologists suggest (124-25). Second, the future is not a “now” which is not yet.

In positive terms Sartre defines the future in the following way. The for-itself flies from itself, from its present. The for-itself, in not being identical with itself, flies or escapes toward its lack. “The possible is that which the For-itself lacks in order to be itself […]” (125). “The Future is the determining being which the For-itself has to be beyond being. There is a Future because the For-itself has to be its being instead of simply being it” (126). Or: “everything which the For-itself is beyond being is the Future” (126).

Sartre uses the word “future” with both a capital and small letter. Perhaps this can be interpreted as his desire to distinguish between the general principles of this temporal dimension and the particular future that he, as a phenomenologist, is interested in. Sartre, en passant, mentions that “through the Future a particular future arrives in the World” (127). If my reading of the relation between the general and the particular future is right, it will explain why Sartre holds that “the Future is not solely the presence of the For-itself to a being situated beyond being” (127), but is also connected with “myself” and with “I” (127-28), which seem to be the particular forms of the For-itself. Sartre’s illustration of himself playing tennis points in the same direction (125, 128).

The final question that Sartre answers concerns the being of the future. This being is defined by the possibilities of the for-itself, of my possibilities, the free choice of which confers meaning to the for-itself’s (or my) being. Writes Sartre: “the Future constitutes the meaning of my present For-itself, as the project of its possibility” (128). Since the for-itself is its future only problematically, for it is separated from it by a nothingness which it is, the for-itself lives in anguish because I am not that future that I have to be, and which gives meaning to my present (129). The future, concludes Sartre, is not a homogeneous succession of moments to come, for my possibilities are always hierarchized.

To sum up: in this section Sartre seems to hold three intertwined points. First, the three temporal dimensions form a synthesis. Second, this synthesis, or totality, is achieved by means of an internal bond. Third, this bond is human. So, as a whole, the for-itself, by not being identical with itself, provides an internal relation between the past, the present, and the future and keeps them in unity.
terms designating the for-itself, which is not identical with itself and affects temporality, are flight (123, 125) and temporal ekstases (130).

2. The Ontology of Temporality. On the basis of temporality as a total structure, Sartre investigates secondary ekstatic structures from two points of view. These points are defined by the assumption of temporality as a succession whose ordering principle is the relation before-after. Sartre calls static temporality the succession of before and after viewed as independent of change. If we focus on the change, we have dynamic temporality. Drawing on Kant, Sartre terms the static and the dynamic temporality order of time and course of time (130).

2.1. Static Temporality. The order “before-after” is irreversible, that is to say, its terms can be considered “only one at a time and only in one direction” (130). Because of that, this order is separation, time is separation, “Time separates me from myself [. . .]” (131).

However, temporality is not only and primarily separation. Time is also “a division which reunites” (131). The problem now is that this unifying relation based on the order before-after is external. As usual, Sartre reflects on several theoretical possibilities that he rejects before giving his positive solution to the problem of temporality as a unifying relation. First, he criticizes the Association School for adopting this kind of unity that presupposes that the successive instants are beings in-itself. But, Sartre concludes, beings in-itself do not relate to one another (131-32). Second, the relation before-after can exist only for a witness who establishes it. But, as Descartes and Kant have shown, this witness, in his temporal ubiquity, is, in reality, atemporal. Such thinking, made in opposition to time, cannot lead to the temporal (132-34). Third, Sartre analyzes the positions of Leibniz and Bergson who have reacted against Descartes and Kant, respectively. Leibniz and Bergson see in temporality “only a pure relation of immanence and cohesion” (134). In the case of both Leibniz and Bergson, holds Sartre, immanence and cohesion lead to the identical, not to the for-itself (134-35).

Now Sartre is ready to offer his positive solution to the problem of time as both separation (or multiplicity) and unification: “temporality is a dissolving force but it is at the center of a unifying act,” it is “a quasi-multiplicity, a foreshadowing of dissociation in the heart of unity” (136). No one of these two aspects of temporality has priority over the other: “it is necessary to conceive of temporality as a unity which multiplies itself; that is, temporality can be only a relation of being at the heart of this same being” (136). This provides the internal bond between before and after (136). Sartre describes the internal relation in this way: “if A is to be prior to B, it must be, in its very being, in B as A’s future. Conversely, B, if it is to be posterior to A must linger behind itself in A, which will confer on B its sense of posteriority” (132). Sartre stresses again his major point, namely, that temporality is human; it comes into the world through the for-itself: “Temporality must have the structure of selfness. [. . .]
Temporality exists only as the intra-structure of a being which has to be its own being; that is, as the intra-structure of a For-itself. […] But Temporality is the being of the For-itself in so far as the For-itself has to be its being ekstatically. Temporality is not, but the For-itself temporalizes itself by existing” (136). The relation before-after expresses that in its being the for-itself is not identical with itself (136). Sartre invents the term “diasporatic” in order to express “the profound cohesion and dispersion” of the for-itself (136) and, one could infer, of its temporality.

The multiple dimensions or quasi-multiples of the for-itself are various relations to its being. The in-itself, on the other hand, has only one dimension, for it is its being. The notion of ekstasis expresses the non-identity of the for-itself with itself: “the ekstasis is distance from self” (137). The for-itself, the consciousness, as non-identical with its being, has three ekstases: “(1) to not-be what it is, (2) to be what it is not, (3) to be what it is not and to not-be what it is” (137). All these dimensions exist in unity: “The For-itself is a being which must simultaneously exist in all its dimensions” (137). Sartre considers these three dimensions one by one.

The first ekstasis expresses the for-itself’s relation to its past. “It is precisely this surpassed facticity which we call the Past” (138). Since the for-itself qua for-itself comes into the world with its past, Sartre is able to pose the question of birth (138-40). He does not ask the metaphysical questions of birth (for instance, how the for-itself is born from a particular embryo, i.e., from the in-itself) that, as he thinks, are perhaps insoluble. The ontological problem of birth is the relation of the in-itself, the for-itself, and the past. To this question Sartre provides the following answers: “Birth as an ekstatic relation of being to the In-itself which it is not and as the a priori constitution of pastness is a law of being for the For-itself. To be For-itself is to be born” (139). Also: “Birth is the upsurge of the absolute relation of Pastness as the ekstatic being of the For-itself in the In-itself. Through birth a Past appears in the world” (140). Finally, the past is outside the unity “reflection-reflecting” of the Erlebnis, that is to say, the past is not an object of study; it is the being of consciousness (140-41).

The second ekstasis or the second dimension of nihilation explains the bond of the for-itself with its future.

The third ekstasis is the for-itself’s present. The present provides “the total synthetic form of Temporality” (142) and therefore, for Sartre, it is the most important of the three ekstases, though as a unity they are ontologically equal: “As Present, Past, Future--all at the same time--the For-itself dispersing its being in three dimensions is temporal due to the very fact that it nihilates itself. No one of these dimensions has any ontological priority over the other; none of them can exist without the other two. Yet in spite of all this, it is best to put the accent on the present ekstasis and not on the future ekstasis as Heidegger does […]” (142).
2.2. The Dynamic of Temporality. This section deals with the relation before-after as change or passage. Change or duration presupposes the answer to two questions. First, why does the for-itself become its past? Second, why does a new for-itself arise to become the present of this past (142)? Sartre, once again, starts with rejecting the theories that, according to him, cannot answer these questions satisfactorily. All of them (here Sartre argues with Leibniz and Kant who theorize on the relation of permanence with change) share a common mistake: they assume that the human being is an in-itself and see the unity of permanence and change as external unity, and not, as Sartre suggests, an internal unity of being (142-43).

The positive thesis of Sartre is difficult to follow mainly because here his aphoristic style too often takes the upper hand over the meaning. The general argument seems to run as follows:

After a closer look, the two questions about the for-itself’s duration formulated at the beginning of the section, turn to reflect one phenomenon: “the upsurge of a new Present which is making-past the Present which it was, and the Making-Past of a Present involving the appearance of a For-itself for which this Present is going to become Past” (144). This, if we paraphrase it, would perhaps mean that the for-itself incessantly renounces its present into a past, for it is never absolutely present to itself.

The past of the for-itself is having been the past of the present of this very for-itself. The past and the pluperfect express that each remote past is connected as the past of a former present (144-45).

The future is also affected by the pastness of the original upsurge of consciousness. The two forms of the future--the immediate future and the far future--are differently related to the new present. In the first case, this of the immediate future, “the Present is given as being this Future in relation to the Past: ‘What I was waiting for--here it is’” (145). The immediate future, on the one hand, is the present of its past in the mode of the former future of this past. On the other hand, it is for-itself as the future of this past, that is, as future it is not what the future promised to be. Sartre sees here a split: “the Present becomes the Former Future of the Past while denying that it is this Future” (145). The original future is not realized, it is no longer future in relation to the present, but only in relation to the past. It becomes “a new future ideally co-present with the Present” (145).

In the case of the far removed future, this future remains future in relation to the new present, if the present is the lack of this particular future. Otherwise, the future loses its character as possibility to the new present and becomes “an indifferent possible” (145) in relation to this new present, i.e., turns into an in-itself: what yesterday was possible, today is no longer my possible. This today’s possible could only be contemplated upon.

Generally speaking, we could say that Sartre’s thesis of the dynamic of temporality, despite its difficulty, follows a well known argument: the for-itself has to negate itself, so as not to become an in-
itself; temporality is one of the modes in which a being of for-itself has to be negated; the dynamic of temporality presents in concrete terms how temporality as negation operates through the fluctuating relations between the three temporal dimensions. The grounds for such a summary could be found immediately after the most difficult pages (144-45) in this section. Here (146-48) Sartre sums up some of his main points about temporality in general, and writes that the “dynamic character of temporality” is not “a contingent quality which is added to the being of the for-itself [. . .] [but] is an essential structure of the For-itself conceived as the being which has to be its own nothingness” (147). He also speaks of the “ekstatic character of temporal being” (147).

Change belongs naturally to the for-itself inasmuch as the for-itself is spontaneity. Spontaneity is, which means that it is both the foundation of its nothingness of being and its being. Spontaneity refuses what it posits. It escapes from itself and escapes from that very escape. It, holds Sartre arguing with Kant, is never essence. Spontaneity is irreversibility, for the order positing-refusing cannot be reversed. By constantly evading what it is, spontaneity is never exhausted in an instantaneous in-itself (148-49).

Sartre takes up what he has said of spontaneity with his terminology of the for-itself, more particularly, the dyad reflection-reflecting. His central point is the relation of similarity between the for-itself and temporality. “What applies to the for-itself as presence to --- is also naturally appropriate as well to the totality of temporalization. This totality never is achieved; it is a totality which is refused and which flees from itself. [. . .] Thus time of consciousness is human reality which temporalizes itself as the totality which is to itself its own incompleteness [. . .]. There is never an instant at which we can assert that the for-itself is, precisely because the for-itself never is. Temporality, on the contrary, temporalizes itself entirely as the refusal of the instant” (149).

3. Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection. This section purports to be about the relation between an original temporality and a derived or psychic temporality. In fact, Sartre deals much more with two forms of reflection: impure and pure. As a whole, therefore, this section could be seen as a part of Sartre’s constant battle on two fronts: against psychology (represented by the impure reflection) and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (represented by the pure reflection) (for such an account of the section, see Macann, Four Phenomenological Philosophers 136-37). One could also see this section as dealing, first, with the characteristics of reflection as a for-itself, and, second, with the temporality of reflection in its two aspects--pure and impure reflection.

The first problem posed by Sartre is that of “the nature and the laws of reflection” (150), for temporality as psychic duration belongs to reflection, and the processes of psychic duration belong to the consciousness reflected-on. Before tackling the problem of how psychic duration is the
immanent object of reflection, Sartre asks the preliminary question of how reflection is possible for a being that can be only in the past. In order to answer it, Sartre makes another digression and turns to the reflective phenomenon and its structure. He writes: “Reflection is the for-itself conscious of itself” (150). Sartre rejects the ideas of Cartesian realism and Husserl’s idealism of reflection because they present the two consciousnesses (the reflective consciousness and the consciousness reflected-on) as an external connection. Sartre, who insists on the internal bond between them--and this internal connection is knowledge--holds that this connection is in the mode of unison and separation of being. “Thus it is necessary that the reflective simultaneously be and not be the reflected-on” (151). But this, Sartre reminds us, is also the ontological structure of the for-itself. The difference is that in the for-itself the two terms reflected and reflecting are in radical Unselbständigkeit, whereas in the case of reflection they tend to the Selbständigkeit, which, however, they cannot achieve (151-52). The reason for this is that though the reflected-on and the reflective are divided by nothingness, they are not a unitary structure of being which can be its own nothingness by having to be it. This is characteristic only of reflection: “it [reflection] is the for-itself which makes itself exist in the mode of reflective-reflected-on, instead by being simply in the mode of the dyad reflection-reflecting” (153). This new mode of being makes the mode of the reflection-reflecting exist as an inner structure--I am reflected on by my own temporal self. Sartre concludes: “the reflective is separated from the reflected-on by a nothingness. Thus the phenomenon of reflection is a nihilation of the for-itself, a nihilation which does not come to it from without but which it has to be” (153). Looking for the origin and motivation of this new negation Sartre writes: “The motivation of reflection (reflexion) consists in a double attempt, simultaneously an objectivation and an interiorization. To be to itself as an object-in-itself in the absolute unity of interiorization--that is what the being-of-reflection has to be” (154). Reflection, summarizes Sartre, is a stage of nihilation intermediate between the simple existence of the for-itself and existence-for-others (154).

The two forms of reflection--pure and impure--give a deeper comprehension of the relation between reflection and temporality. Sartre begins with pure reflection and writes that “the reflective is the reflected-on” (155), but this unity is the unity of nihilation. Reflection “is a knowledge” (155) or “a recognition rather than knowledge” (156). Descartes’ cogito, explains Sartre, is limited to the instant. In reality, Descartes’ doubt as the methodological basis of knowledge means a suspension of judgment which presupposes, first, reference to the past (our reasons for judging are insufficient), second, to the future (in order to judge we need new elements), and third, being-in-the-world of human reality where one is outside himself and is present to the object one doubts (156). Sartre writes: “reflection is the for-itself which seeks to recover itself as a totality in perpetual incompleteness. [. . .] Reflection, as the
mode of being of the for-itself, must be a temporalization, and it is itself its past and its future. [. . .] reflection is a diasporatic phenomenon; but as a presence to itself, the for-itself is a presence present to all its ekstatic dimensions” (157). Sartre, in explaining the temporal character of reflection, refers to what reminds one of Heidegger’s Geschichtlichkeit, historicity: “Reflection therefore apprehends temporality and reveals it as the unique and incomparable mode of being of a selfness--that is, as historicity” (158).

Now Sartre introduces the notion of psychological or psychic duration or temporality (158-70 reveals Sartre’s psychology). It is described as “successions of organized temporal forms,” “the concrete flow of autonomous organizations” (158), “a successive order of facts” (159)--for instance, joy after a sadness--and is “the opposite of historicity” (158). These unities or forms are connected by relations of before and after, and are used in dating. The psychic objects are what they are; they follow each other “in universal time” and enter only in “external relations of succession” (158). They are the object of psychology. Men establish their relations on the level of these psychic facts (jealousies, grudges, struggles, etc.), but the for-itself which historicizes itself is not these states, acts, or facts. The identity of the for-itself with its psychic states would turn the for-itself into “a multiplicity of existents external to one another” (159), and thus would make the ontological problem of temporality unresolvable. This gives grounds to Sartre to attack psychology that explains the relativity in the succession of the psychic facts without ontological foundation. “In fact if we apprehend the for-itself in its historicity, psychic duration vanishes and states, qualities, and acts disappear to give place to being-for-itself as such, which is only as the unique individuality from which the process of historization cannot be separated” (159).

There are two temporalities, writes Sartre: “the original temporality of which we are the temporalization” (159) and the psychic temporality which is “incompatible with the mode of being of our being” (159), intersubjective reality, object of psychology, and goal of our acts. Psychic temporality is derived but does not stem directly from original temporality. Psychic temporality, as successive order of facts, cannot constitute itself. This temporality is revealed and constituted by impure or constituent reflection. Impure reflection is given in everyday life that includes as its original structure pure reflection. From here on Sartre describes impure reflection.

Pure reflection occurs in the relation of the reflective and reflected-on in the for-itself. Impure reflection (and here Sartre is not very clear due, partially, to his verbal games), on the other hand, is described by its connection with the in-itself. In impure reflection three forms exist: “the reflective, the reflected-on, and an in-itself which the reflective has to be in so far as this in-itself would be the reflected-on, an in-itself which is nothing other than the For of the reflective phenomenon” (160).
Impure reflection is in bad faith, for it cuts the bond uniting the reflective and reflected-on: “Impure reflection is an abortive effort on the part of the for-itself to be another while remaining itself” (161). Sartre concludes: “What is revealed to it [impure reflection] is not the temporal and non-substantial historicity of the reflected-on; beyond this reflected-on it is the very substantiality of the organized forms of the flow” (161). Psychology studies the substantial unities which are called psychic life or psyche, and which degrade the reflected-on to the in-itself. In order to clarify the nature of this in-itself, Sartre gives an a priori description of the Psyche.

First, the Psyche is the ego (with grammatical forms “I” and “me”) with its states, qualities, and acts; it is “our personas a transcendent psychic unity” (162) (Sartre describes the ego in detail on 102-0559). Second, the “psychic” is given only to a special category of cognitive acts, these of the reflective for-itself (162-63). Third, the psyche is the object of psychological research. Sartre terms the immediate presence of hate, exile, etc. evidence (163-64). Fourth, and to this characteristic Sartre devotes more attention, the psychic object is the degraded form of consciousness, “the psychic object is in-itself” (165), and therefore it is the past which has priority among the three temporal dimensions. The psychologists, holds Sartre, naively distinguish the three “nows” of the psychic by seeking help in the unconscious. The psychic so apprehended, is a cohesion of isolated “nows” but not a synthesis, an ekstatic unity which is the being of the for-itself. Yet, by inertia, the psychic and the for-itself are mixed, for “the psychic is the objectivation of the ontological unity of the For-itself” (166). “Thus participating simultaneously in the in-itself and in the for-itself, psychic temporality conceals a contradiction which is never overcome” (167). The ambiguity of this mixing, Sartre thinks, is brought to light by Bergson’s theory of consciousness which endures and which is “multiplicity of interpenetration” (166). Sartre writes that what he calls “psychic temporality is an inert datum, closely akin to Bergson’s duration” (167).

After this analysis of the psychic, Sartre is ready to examine the interrelations of psychic forms in psychic time. First, the connection between feelings in a complex psychic form is by means of interpenetration: friendship, for instance, is tinted with envy. Second, psychic processes imply “the action from a distance of prior forms on posterior forms” (167). This action is not a simple causal one which we find in physics.

As the objectivation of the for-itself, the psychic possesses a degraded spontaneity. Discussing the character of this spontaneity, Sartre concludes that “the prior form has to effect from a distance the birth of a form of the same nature which is organized spontaneously as a form of flow” (168). And the flow, as we already know, is not a being that has to be its future and past, i.e., the for-itself, but successions of past, present, and future forms which influence one another at a distance. The influence
is either by penetration (the reflective apprehends as a single object two separate psychic objects) or by motivation (the two objects remain separate and influence one another at a distance). On the basis of this action at a distance, which is “totally magical and irrational” (168), Sartre criticizes what he designates as intellectualistic psychologists who, remaining on the level of the psychic, try to deduce this action to causality (to illustrate his point Sartre analyzes a passage by Proust).

Finally, Sartre sums up the nature of the psychic temporality and the original temporality, which here he apparently relates to the in-itself and the for-itself, respectively. It is the clarity of Sartre’s summary that tempts me to summarize it at some length. In contrast to what the intellectualistic psychologists attempt, Sartre thinks, we should give up hope of reducing the rational in the psychic causality. “This causality is a degradation of the ekstatic for-itself, which is its own being at a distance from itself, its degradation into magic, into an in-itself which is what it is at its own place. Magic action through influence at a distance is the necessary result of this relaxation of the bonds of being. The psychologist must describe these irrational bonds and take them as an original given of the psychic world” (169). “Thus,” Sartre continues, “the reflective consciousness is constituted as consciousness of duration, and hence psychic duration appears to consciousness. This psychic temporality as a projection into the in-itself of original temporality is a virtual being whose phantom flow does not cease to accompany the ekstatic temporalization of the for-itself in so far as this is apprehended by reflection. [. . .] But its [of psychic temporality] essential difference from original temporality is that it is while original temporality temporalizes itself” (170). Psychic time, therefore, can be constituted only with the past and the future as past coming after the present past.

Ideas of Temporality in Sartre’s Literary Criticism

Sartre’s theory of temporality is exposed not only in BN but, in some of its aspects, in some of his critical essays such as “On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the Work of Faulkner,” written in July 1939. I do not hold that Sartre’s philosophy can be better understood through his literary work as many Sartre students, as we have seen in note 19, think. The main reason for my skepticism to this type of reading philosophy and literature is that literature does not quote philosophic ideas as such but represents artistically these ideas; in the same way literature does not deal with human beings or landscapes but with their artistic representations. All these representations are but elements that serve a higher purpose that can be defined as speaking of the human in its totality. No other discourse speaks of the human in this fashion, and this makes literature and art in general unique and irreplaceable. If literature conveys philosophical ideas, it is not through its content (its “what”) but through its form (its “how”). Sartre’s novel Nausea, for instance, is an existentialist classic not so much because it quotes
passages or key terms of his philosophy (if it were only this, what were we to do with the parts that do not refer directly to philosophical conceptions or turn Descartes’ cogito into an ironic and polemic incantation [cf. Nausea 99-103]?), but because Sartre’s artistic genius has been able to invent literary devices that represent structurally, by means of the architectonics of the whole work, certain relationships between the for-itself and the in-itself (for example, juxtapositions such as warm vs. cold; light vs. darkness; controversial and illogical vs. identical with oneself and complacent; animate vs. inanimate; whole vs. partial; human vs. animal; jazz vs. silence; non-ironic narration vs. ironic narration, etc.). The representation of strictly philosophical—and any other—ideas is only one, semantic, level of literature’s complex architectonics.

In discussing Sartre’s ideas of temporality in his literary criticism my preliminary point is that there are two types of criticism: first, one which is true to the work analyzed, that is, one that allows the work to reveal its own meanings; and, second, one which is true to its own doctrine, that is, one that imposes its own ideas onto the work. Sartre’s essay is of the second type. What Sartre actually discusses is not primarily temporality in Faulkner, but his, Sartre’s, own ideas of temporality spelled out a propos Faulkner (here I do not consider the social implications of the essay which, under certain circumstances, may have the leading role in its interpretation).

Sartre’s argument in the essay has several main points and in its orientation toward the future declares clearly its indebtedness to Heidegger. The fictional technique, thinks Sartre, is related to the novelist’s metaphysics; to explain the technique as a critic is to explain the novelist’s metaphysics (with this move Sartre shows that he is more interested in his own theory than in Faulkner per se) (84-85). Further, Faulkner’s metaphysics is a metaphysics of time (85). Temporality is not chronology; the former is personal, whereas the latter is measured objectively with dates and clocks (an echo from Augustine). Faulkner deals with temporality (85). Faulkner’s temporality is restricted to the present, which is characterized, first, by being catastrophic (85), second, by “a sinking in,” that is, the present is dissociated from the future--it appears without any reason and sinks in (85). For Faulkner, as for Proust, time is that which separates (89). This means that both Faulkner and Proust have deprived the present of its future, “its dimension of deeds and freedom” (90). In a similar way, many of their great peers--Joyce, Dos Pasos, Gide, Virginia Woollf--distort time by reducing it to the instant, in other words, they split the synthetic unity, to use Sartre’s terminology from BN, between the three temporal dimensions. And there is the rub: “but if you do away with the future, time is no longer that which separates, that which cuts the present off from itself” (91). (Here, apparently, Sartre uses the word “to separate” in two senses. On the one hand, time in the great contemporary writers separates the temporal dimensions and thus, to use the jargon of BN, turns temporality into chronology, and the for-itself into
an in-itself. On the other hand, the separation which is human and temporal is this which separates the for-itself from itself, from its own temporality and thus keeps the temporal dimensions in unity.) To put it differently, the present without the future turns into the perpetual present of the nonhuman objects, “into universal time, the time of planets and nebulae” (91) and loses its character of human temporality. In Faulkner, everything is absurd because human temporality strives to become nonhuman universal time. If consciousness exists in such universal time, it would be first consciousness and afterwards temporal. But that is impossible, for consciousness is always temporal: “Consciousness can ‘exist within time’ only on condition that it becomes time as a result of the very movement by which it becomes consciousness. It must be ‘temporalized’, as Heidegger says” (92). Consciousness is its future possibilities. There is no consciousness without future. Therefore, Faulkner’s characters are not true to human consciousness, but to the temporal absurdity which Faulkner himself has put into them. (If one translates the Heideggerian language of Sartre into the idiom of BN, one could probably say that Faulkner turns his characters into the in-itself, whereas they, as human presentations, are inherently the for-itself.) Finally, Sartre asks what is the meaning of this un-novelistic and untrue absurdity in Faulkner and many of his peers. The explanation lies “in the social conditions of our present time” (92). The whole life now, says Sartre, is bereft of future and the change could come only through a cataclysm. Faulkner’s despair, therefore, precedes his metaphysics. Sartre likes Faulkner’s art but not his metaphysics. Sartre, with the help of Heidegger, ends on a high note that, potentially, keeps the door ajar for human free choice and hope: “A closed future is still a future” (93).

1995
Contrary to the recent academic tendency to limit endnotes to the minimum—a trend dictated more by financial rather than scholarly reasons—my study relies on extensive notes to clarify why Sartre’s theory of time has not been thoroughly presented in Anglo-American academia.

1 Klaus Hartmann explains that Sartre has a “bent for strict philosophy and is interested in specific problems of traditional philosophy rather than in ideological solutions. In this spirit we can understand his work as the latest metamorphosis of the Western philosophical heritage, designed to take up some of its unsolved problems” (146). Herbert Spiegelberg (2nd ed. 2: 445-515) places Sartre in the phenomenological tradition. He writes that “it was Sartre who naturalized phenomenology in France. He also emancipated and remodeled it in essential points. But he did not reconstruct it methodically and systematically. For the explicit and deliberate constitution of French phenomenology we have to turn to his associates, beginning with Maurice Merleau-Ponty” (2nd ed. 2: 511). For Sartre as a thinker in the Western tradition, see also: Naess 272; and Jones 438-39.

Stuart L. Charmé, in Vulgarity and Authenticity, notes that Sartre’s “anticipation of many of the concerns of ‘postmodernists’ has not been sufficiently appreciated” (3); and also: “The problematic nature of personal identity that preoccupies postmodern consciousness attracted Sartre’s attention from the start of his career” (4). Charmé defines the goal of his study in the following way: “The present study investigates the complex interrelationship of self and otherness in Sartre’s work with particular attention to a critical psychological component of personal identity, the theme of civility and vulgarity” (6). And also: “In time, Sartre found himself attracted to blacks, women, homosexuals, Jews, and other marginalized groups. [...] This book will use Sartre's philosophical system as well as his literary and critical works to explore an underlying mythology of the vulgar Other in his [Sartre’s] work and to discuss its implications for the notion of self” (8). Further we will see that Sartre, though not fashionable as he used to be, still generates interpretations pertinent to our time.

2 Ricoeur writes: “What remains, then, is to conceive of the threefold present as distension and distension as the distension of the threefold present. This is the stroke of genius of Book 11 of Augustine’s Confessions, in whose wake will follow Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty” (Time 1: 16). One may ask why Ricoeur omits Sartre if, as Christopher Macann points out, Sartre “is deeply indebted to Heidegger” for his theory of temporality (Four Phenomenological Philosophers 132).

For the notion of time in the phenomenological writings of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, see also Macann, Four Phenomenological Philosophers 19-24, 53-54, 96-105, 118-19, 132-36, 140, 195-98. For Heidegger on time, see Kockelmans; Dastur; and Naess 213-18. For Merleau-Ponty on time, see Carr 401-04.

3 The place and meaning of temporality in BN is commented upon by Catalano 69-70, 72 n. 11, 111-12; and Macann, Four Phenomenological Philosophers 132-33. Hartmann (94-98) offers scattered but valuable remarks on this topic; he also draws a parallel between Sartre’s theory of temporality and Hegel’s view of time.

4 Hartmann’s study Sartre’s Ontology is one of the very few books in English which deals, in a strictly philosophical—not popular—sense, with the topic of temporality in BN. In his investigation, Hartmann attempts a “critical interpretation” (126) of Sartre’s dialectical ontology that develops from a phenomenological starting point. Hegel, for Hartmann, serves to make some of Sartre’s notions appear plausible (127-28). Hartmann also “focuses on the sources of inspiration of this [Sartre’s] philosophy” (146); “our analysis,” writes Hartmann, “is not limited to a study of Sartre’s ontology in the light of Hegel’s Logic, but deals, from a wider perspective, with his philosophy as a union of phenomenology and Hegelian dialectic” (139). Hartmann’s analysis of temporality in BN (85-94) is restricted to his ontological project. That is why this author deals with Part Two, Chapter Two of BN, but ignores the sections “Static Temporality” (BN 130-42) and “Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection” (BN 150-70).

In his book Sartre, Antony Manser presents what he considers to be “the hard core of philosophic argument” in Sartre (Preface). He deals only with the first section of the chapter on temporality in BN, i.e., only with the three temporal dimensions (65-70). Manser’s major point is that only the for-itself, not the in-itself, is temporal. In his exposition of Sartre, however, the author includes some parallels with psychologists that, in my opinion, do not support Sartre’s ideas.

Alfred Stern, in his book Sartre, presents Sartre’s philosophy and psychoanalysis and, in this context, discusses some of his creative works. Sartre’s theory of temporality is briefly outlined in connection with what Stern calls Sartre’s psychology of death. The author speaks, in fact, not of the whole theory, but only of the temporal dimensions. After presenting very succinctly the present and the future (167), Stern comments on the connection between the past and death.
in BN (167-69), and illustrates his point with examples from Sartre’s literary works (169-70, 197); this author also provides literary illustrations of Sartre’s ideas of the future (173-76).

Hazel E. Barnes’ book Sartre is a general, chronological presentation of Sartre’s philosophical and creative writings (8). The discussion of Sartre’s ideas of time (20-21, 66-74) is based on Part Two and Part Four of BN and deals—quite freely—more with the problem of the self and freedom than with Sartre’s theory of temporality.

Joseph S. Catalano’s work A Commentary is a detailed paraphrasing of BN that is more readable than Sartre’s work itself and, in principle, does not quote Sartre. The author accepts Sartre’s “presentations and evaluations [of other philosophers and psychologists in BN] at face value” (xii), that is, Catalano’s work often lacks meta-distance from its subject. Catalano spends more effort in clarifying the Introduction and the first two parts of BN. In treating temporality in BN (111-31) the author, despite his commitment to Sartre’s text, goes astray from the original; he, for example, gives his own examples which change the meaning of the original, does not use Sartre’s terminology (especially in the presentation of section three, BN 150-70), etc. Catalano tackles the problem of impure reflection (BN 158-70) very briefly.

Gila J. Hayim, in The Existential Sociology of Jean-Paul Sartre, touches on temporality in Sartre on three occasions. First, the author discusses temporality in Sartre’s later works (Search for a Method and Critique of Dialectical Reason; these two books are translations of Sartre’s Critique de la raison dialectique) in connection with human action, and compares Sartre’s ideas, on the one hand, with those of Max Weber (5-11) and, on the other hand, with the existential theory of action in BN which is interrelated with time (49). Second, Hayim briefly comments on the connection between time (the future), freedom, and the existential experience of absence in BN (12-13). Third, this scholar speaks of the relation of anguish and the future, and the self and the future in BN (17-18, 27-28). As a whole, Hayim does not deal at length with Sartre’s theory of temporality as it is developed in Part Two, Chapter Two of BN.

Macann’s Four Phenomenological Philosophers is a succinct and quite often critical presentation of the main ideas of Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, Sartre’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s major phenomenological works. According to this author, time for Sartre, together with freedom, are the “two pillars” (118) on which the thesis of Nothingness is erected (118-19); here Macann has in mind Sartre’s presentation of the past, the present, and the future (BN 107-27). Macann holds that Sartre’s thesis of existential time is deeply indebted to Heidegger but, as a whole, is a failure: “But the static, dualistic ontology to which Sartre now attempts to accord a specific and characteristic temporality is, in my opinion, so far removed from what is required to render intelligible a variant of Heidegger’s existential time that this section [the section on temporality in BN] cannot but fail in its basic intention, which is to render intelligible the existential temporality of human being. To put it another way, Sartre is still so much under the spell of Descartes that he finds himself more or less incapable of transcending that very instantaneous he himself will criticize as the limiting factor in the Cartesian conception of time” (132-33). Macann covers the main points of Sartre’s notion of temporality (118-19, 132-37) and briefly mentions (140) what Sartre calls “The Time of the World” (BN 204-16).

Temporality is missing from more sophisticated introductions and comments on Sartre and BN such as: Barnes’ “Translator’s Introduction”; Thompson and Thompson; Naess 265-359; Barnes, “Sartre’s Ontology”; Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre; and Aronson.

The same holds true for some general histories of philosophy such as Stumpf 465-70; Hamlyn 325-27; Jones 418-46; and Copleston 340-89. Frederick Charles Copleston (357-58) mentions the problem of temporality in connection with freedom. In the presentation of BN, Marjorie Grene’s Sartre briefly discusses temporality (131-32). The same holds true for Phyllis Sutton Morris, Sartre’s Concept of a Person; this author speaks of “personal identity through time” and “temporal synthesis of consciousness” (42; see also 41-43).

Somewhat surprisingly, Spiegelberg bypasses the temporality of consciousness. According to him, Sartre’s theory of time differs both from Husserl’s and Heidegger’s but “these differences are partly based on misunderstanding; in the present context these are not worth pursuing” (2nd ed. 2: 491). Spiegelberg refers to temporality en passant on several more occasions (2nd ed. 2: 445-46, 452, 470, 483-84, 491). The first of them is particularly interesting, for here the author complains that it is difficult to interpret Sartre, since his work is still in progress, i.e., to use Sartre’s idiom, Sartre, being alive and changing his views, is still a for-itself, he is not yet dead, i.e., an in-itself which would make him identical with himself and thus subject him only to the interpretations of other people.

See Ricoeur, Main Trends 47-49; Craib vii; and Macann, Four Phenomenological Thinkers ix. For Sartre’s reception in the English-speaking countries in particular, see Silverman and Elliston, Preface; their point could be summarized in this way: “Sartrian philosophy was always foreign [in the English-speaking countries]—except for those who were already committed to French thought in general” (xii).
In his work, Manser exposes his thoughts at encountering Sartre; these notes are perhaps the most interesting testimony of how an English philosopher, educated in a philosophical tradition different from Sartre’s, interprets him in the mid 1960s. Manser writes: “In some ways his [Sartre’s] philosophic background and methods are far removed from those in which I was educated, yet often I have found the difference to be one of terminology rather than of thought. Consequently I feel that the effort to understand him will prove worth while to those whose first impulse is to reject” (Preface; see also 73 and especially 39-53 where Manser introduces his own reading of BN). Manser’s book contains an interesting chapter on Sartre’s ideas of philosophical language compared to the English analytic philosophers; here the author endeavors to show in practice that Sartre, after all, is not so different from the British language tradition in philosophy (100-13). For Manser’s effort to bridge the Continental and the English philosophical traditions, see also 260-65.

In the mid 1960s, in a collection of original American phenomenological works, the American philosopher James M. Edie, one of the then-younger leaders of phenomenological thought in the U.S., proudly proclaimed America’s coming-of-phenomenological-age: “There is good reason to believe that in future surveys or histories of twentieth-century American philosophy the 1960’s will be recognized as the period when the phenomenological movement finally took root in our philosophical soil and became an active and creative force in its own right” (7). Ironically, Spiegelberg, the classic historian of phenomenology, does not share Edie’s enthusiasm: “There can be little doubt that at the present moment phenomenology, along with existentialism, has less philosophical status in Britain than in any other country outside Soviet Russia” (2nd ed. 2: 623). Spiegelberg adds: “Phenomenology is hardly one of the leading philosophical movements in the United States, any more than it is in Britain. Judging from some recent surveys of philosophical trends it even seems to have lost ground after 1950. In contrast to other philosophical movements recently imported from continental Europe, it has not secured a major place in the leading universities of the country” (2nd ed. 2: 626-27). The question of America’s phenomenological maturity poses problems to Sartre students in the U.S. a decade after Edie’s proclamation. Morris, for instance, tries to balance between the early Sartre’s and English-speaking philosophers’ concept of a person (ix-xi). Spiegelberg, in the third edition of his book, points out the growing popularity of phenomenology in Great Britain and especially in the United States in the 1970s, but tentatively declines to affirm that the quantitative growth means qualitative improvement too (3rd ed. 661-66).

7 For the systematic character of BN, see Naess 357-59; Fry 15-16; and Manser 39.
8 The whole presentation of Sartre’s phenomenology (not confined to BN alone) in Spiegelberg’s The Phenomenological Movement (2nd ed. 2: 445-515; in the third edition of Spiegelberg’s book there are no important changes) explains how the French philosopher tries to reconcile the object and the subject (2nd ed. 2: 455, 470-71) by drawing on Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel. Spiegelberg’s analyses stress Sartre’s similarities to and differences from Husserl and Heidegger. Catalano (1-13) delineates Sartre’s indebtedness to Descartes and Husserl whom, according to Catalano, Sartre takes as the paradigmatic thinkers of Cartesian realism and idealism, respectively, the two trends of thought that Sartre tries to overcome in BN; for Sartre’s indebtedness to Heidegger see Catalano 15. Mary Warnock gives a broad picture of Cartesianism in Sartre (The Philosophy of Sartre 13-41), and examines Sartre’s connection with Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger in relation to the problem of the other (The Philosophy of Sartre 67-72). Hartmann (139-42) provides a detailed analysis of Sartre’s epistemological position in BN and Husserl’s phenomenology. He views “phenomenology as an antecedent of Sartre’s philosophy which serves him as a starting point” (139). Copleston (343) mentions Sartre’s indebtedness to Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel. In Sartre and Hegel, Christopher M. Fry (21-33) analyzes Sartre’s relation to Husserl on the problem of intentionality. Robert D. Cumming, in his essay “Role-Playing,” discusses Husserl’s and Sartre’s interpretation of role-playing as a starting point for an analysis of Sartrean phenomenology. Thomas W. Busch, in The Power of Consciousness (1-17), traces the initial encounter of Sartre with Husserl’s phenomenology. The same author, in “Sartre’s Use of Reductions” 17-29, analyzes Sartre’s use of reduction compared with Husserlian phenomenological reduction. Frederick A. Elliston, in “Sartre and Husserl,” compares Sartre’s and Husserl’s treatment of intersubjectivity.

For Sartre and Heidegger, see Fry 99-102, 126-27, etc. Michel Haar’s article “Sartre and Heidegger” compares Sartre’s and Heidegger’s ideas of consciousness, nothingness, anxiety, the others, and death. William Ralph Schroeder’s Sartre and his Predecessors investigates the theories of the self and the other of Husserl, Hegel, Heidegger, and Sartre. Grene (32-104) divides the major predecessors of Sartre (not only in respect of BN, but also in respect of his later philosophy) into two groups: first, the phenomenologists—Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger and, second, the dialecticians—Hegel and the two greatest nineteenth-century critics of Hegel: Kierkegaard (about whom Grene is very tentative) and Marx (and Marxism in general).
For Sartre’s relations with Hegel, see: Naess 271, 281, 296; Catalano 8-9 n. 5, 42 n. 15, 58-60, 61 n. 5, 72 n. 11; and Macann, *Four Phenomenological Philosophers* 117, 125. Some of the important works in this field are Hartmann; and Fry; see also: Bernstein, particularly Part I and II; and Verstraeten. Hartmann summarizes Sartre’s relation with Hegel thus: “His view of Hegel has been formed ad hoc, in connection with his phenomenological philosophy; it is not derived from the French Hegelian tradition” (xvi; see also xv-xvii). Fry writes: “any use of Hegel by Sartre was not systematic. To follow *L’être et le néant* precludes following Hegel” (9; see also 8, 17, 147, 150, 151, 152). Fry often argues with Hartmann about Hegel’s influence on Sartre: see especially 9, 33-37, 84-85, etc.

Sartre usually opens the chapters and sections of *BN* by criticizing the ideas of the classical philosophers--Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Aristotle, Kierkegaard, Bergson--on certain topics. After the criticism he remodels these topics in accordance with his own goals. Sartre’s indebtedness to other philosophers depends on how one reads his philosophy. For Sartre’s sources and his reworking of them, see Hartmann; Copleston 343 n. 2; and Fry 3-8, 125-28.

9 Naess (279-337), for example, restricts his analysis of *BN* mainly to the Introduction and Part One because he considers them the most difficult in the book. Catalano also deals in greater detail with the Introduction, Part One, and Part Two, and pays less attention to Part Three, Part Four, and the Conclusion. The same, more or less, holds true for Hartmann; Jones; Copleston; and Fry.

10 Barnes, for instance, holds that “the keystone of Sartre’s philosophy [. . .] [is] precisely his insistence on man’s radical freedom and his ability to make a new ‘choice of being’” (*Sartre* 27).

11 See: Anderson; and Simont. See also the older and popular presentation of the ethical ideas of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre (in *BN*) in Warnock’s book *Existentialist Ethics*.

12 Copleston speaks of Sartre’s professional “turgid jargon” (xiii). “His jargon is simply irritating. If what he says sometimes seems to be extremely obscure, this is not because what he is saying is unintelligible, but because he has chosen to express in difficult language something which could have been said much more plainly” (xvi). Manser deals with Sartre’s language on different occasions. Some of what he writes sounds, to say the least, curious, and to say it bluntly, with a great deal of linguistic and philosophical chauvinism: “It is clear that the book [*BN*] is too long by modern English standards” (39). Or: “It is possible to find sentences that are turgid and almost incomprehensible, though some of those quoted as examples of this fault are clearer in context” (40). Also: “Part of the difficulty at the stylistic level springs, I think, from the French language itself. For the spirit of that language is not well adapted to philosophic thought” (41). To read *Critique de la raison dialectique*, according to this English philosopher, is a “herculean task” (206). Fry observes: “The influence of German phenomenology is often apparent in Sartre’s versions of German phraseology and even etymology” (44 n. 22). Grene describes the attraction and repulsion of the English-speaking reader to Sartre in this way: “Man of words, indeed! A juggler of words, perhaps, who means next to nothing by them?” (28). Hayim notes the “difficult language” of *BN* (xii). Morris is of the opinion that “one of the severest difficulties is that, even in English, Sartre’s ideas are obscured by his strange and difficult terminology” (ix). Warnock writes: “He [Sartre] is extraordinarily obscure and repetitious” (*The Philosophy of Sartre* 9); “he does not want to be precise, nor to get things exactly right”; Sartre is “a literary metaphysician” (*The Philosophy of Sartre* 10); Warnock complains of the “deliberate obscurity [of Sartre’s later reexamination of Marxism]” (*The Philosophy of Sartre* 12). Silverman and Elliston find that *Critique of Dialectical Reason* employs a “tortuous style” (Preface xi). Spiegelberg speaks at some length of Sartre’s style (2nd ed. 2: 446-47, 472, 481-82, 485, 487), and touches on nearly all the difficulties that I discuss in my essay. Perhaps the horror of the English-speaking scholar from Sartre’s language is spelled out most expressively by Dominick LaCapra, who writes that *BN* is “one of Sartre’s most troubled texts, a veritable textual jungle (it might be read as a philosophical systematization of a paranoid-schizophrenic world view)” (122).

Edie, in contrast to the Continental phenomenological idiom, is proud to offer a new type of phenomenological language cultivated in the United States: “There is an unspoken but clearly evident aberration of the intricacies of technical jargon [by the authors in the collection] when this is not specifically helpful or necessary to the argument” (8-9).

13 See Macann, *Four Phenomenological Thinkers* 116-17. According to Macann, Part Four of *BN* devoted to Having, Doing, and Being, is “strangely incoherent, since it calls for nothing less than the substitution of a new set of ontological categories for those in terms of which the entire analysis has been conducted thus far” (111-12). See also Hartmann 20. Catalano often changes the terminology of Sartre, perhaps in order to mitigate the bewilderment by the differences between the earlier and the later terminology in *BN*; the good intentions of Catalano, however, sometimes lead to confusion instead of clarity. Such is the case with Catalano’s commentary on the third section of the chapter on temporality in *BN*, “Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection” (*BN* 150-70).
Catalano (191, 191 n. 4, 218 n. 2, 231) points out some other unfulfilled promises in BN. Spiegelberg, as I have mentioned in note 5, finds the main difficulty in interpreting Sartre’s phenomenology “in its incompleteness” (2nd ed. 2: 445). By now, since Sartre is dead and many of his unpublished works have been brought to the public, this reason does not play such an important role.

Catalano points out many such examples (58, 65, 77, 89, 89 n. 9, 103, 106 n. 9, 118 n. 7, 123, 129 n. 14, 133 n. 2, 135, 137, 138, 142 n. 7, 144 n. 8, 167 n. 11, 215 n. 1, 228 n. 2). See also: Fry 44 n. 22; Hartmann 6 n. 10, 73, 79-82, 99, 113 n. 35, 119 n. 57, 123, 135, 135 n. 19, 141, 147; and Naess 299-300, 329. Fry (47 n. 28, 75 n. 112, 94) argues that Sartre frequently (mis)quotes Hegel and sometimes confuses Hegel’s thought. Spiegelberg comments on a typical passage in BN in the following way: “Suffice it to say that in cases like these Sartre seems to be starting from original and significant observations, only to be carried away to paradoxical formulations bordering on the nonsensical” (2nd ed. 2: 487).

Hartmann (24 n. 69), on the other hand, points out cases in which Sartre’s text is misunderstood: for example, W. Desan confuses Sartre’s pre-reflective cogito with his cogito. Naess (318-20) also reminds us of the unfair, in some respects, criticism of Sartre’s le néant by A. J. Ayer, due partially to a misunderstanding of BN. Misunderstanding in philosophy is often the understanding: Husserl’s criticism of Brentano’s theory of an internal consciousness, for example, involves a terminological misunderstanding (Hartmann 24-25).

See, for instance, the detailed analyses of Sartre’s basic paradox that the for-itself, consciousness, or human reality is what it is not, and is not what it is: Naess 316-18; Catalano 84; and Jones 437-38. Spiegelberg writes of this paradox: “One feature of Sartre’s style in L’Être et le néant calls for special comment, his new fondness for paradoxical and baffling formulations, which at times suggest even plays on words” (2nd ed. 2: 472; see also 2: 481). See also Copleston 349.

LaCapra is perhaps the only English-speaking scholar who, to my knowledge, promises to examine not only the thematic content of BN but also “the way in which the text is made” (122). In his deconstructive reading of Sartre and BN in particular, however, LaCapra’s promises, in my opinion, are more interesting than his actual achievements. LaCapra does not discuss Sartre’s ideas of temporality.

William Leon McBride writes: “Despite the enormous length and complexity of Sartre’s writings, the core of his ontology [in BN] is, as one might expect and hope for it to be, essentially very simple. [. . .] This is, precisely, the phenomenon of being” (264). Catalano often both simplifies Sartre’s text and adds his own examples to make Sartre’s point more perspicuous; the result, as we shall see, is not always the presumed faithfulness to the original.

It is the descriptive character of Sartre’s philosophy that tempts many of his serious commentators to interpret his philosophy using his literary works (the novel Nausea, in the first place) and vice versa. Perhaps the most striking example in this respect is Jones (419-28, 433, 435, 438) who presents the problem of the self, which is central in Jones’ discussion of Sartre, in this way. Manser (1-19) also introduces the core of Sartre’s philosophy by referring to Nausea; he speaks at length as well about the relation between Sartre’s philosophy in general and his novels (167-88) and his philosophy and his plays (47). On Nausea and BN, see also Fry 40-45; Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre 90-99; and Barnes, Sartre 36-47. Spiegelberg uses Sartre’s literary works, including Nausea, in order to clarify Sartre’s philosophy (2nd ed. 2: 455-57, 497). LaCapra attempts a reading of Nausea as “a novel antinovel or a deconstructed novel” (97); for LaCapra’s deconstructive reading of the novel, see 93-116. Walter Kaufmann, in his anthology Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre widely used in American universities as an introduction to the study of existentialism, includes, among other things, Sartre’s short story “The Wall” because, as he writes, it “is one of the classics of existentialism” (280). Unfortunately, Kaufmann forgets to explain how precisely the story is connected with existentialism. It seems that in this case the belief that Sartre’s literary works reveal automatically his philosophy is taken for granted. The inertia of the merging of literature and philosophy seems so strong that even a critic of the rank of Tzvetan Todorov echoes it: “Sartre’s writings span the genres, and no watertight compartments separate philosophy, criticism, and fiction in his work” (44); fortunately, Todorov’s analysis of Sartre’s critical writing on literature does not follow this line.

Catalano (118 n. 8, 215 n. 1) points out cases in which Sartre’s illustrations refer ambiguously to his universal argument. Hartmann (13 n. 38, 62 n. 5) discusses the inadequacy of some of Sartre’s examples. Naess remarks: “Although Sartre’s own examples are clear enough, they are often so infused with theoretical consideration as to make any straightforward formulations of them difficult, if not impossible” (297). Spiegelberg (2nd ed. 2: 510) speaks of the positive and the negative characteristics of Sartre’s descriptive method based on intuition and the choice of his examples.

Hartmann draws a parallel between Sartre’s BN and Hegel’s Encyclopedia and Logic: “Hegel’s philosophical system is laid out in an architectonic order, which might be called a ‘projective’ order: notions occurring at the beginning of the Logic--being, determine being, being-for-itself--have analogies in subsequent notions or recur in them in an
amplified manner” (130); see also 130-32. From Hartmann’s formal analysis of Hegel’s philosophy in its dialectical movement we could infer some formal principles of Sartre’s writing and dialectical thinking. Hartmann’s comparative approach leads him to this conclusion: “Sartre’s philosophy in EN [BN] is found to be the consistent transformation of Hegel’s Logic, resulting from a rejection of the immanence of thought” (132). Catalano points out numerous cases of Sartre’s referring to different parts of BN in order to develop his notions (63, 68 n. 8, 69, 72, 72 n. 11, 74, 88, 96, 103 n. 5, 108 n. 10, 110 n. 11, etc.).

22 Catalano explains some such cases (14, 26 n. 5, 29-30, 35 n. 13, 41 n. 14, 44, 46 n. 16, 57 n. 2, 79 n. 2, 118 n. 7, 126, 126 n. 1, 132 n. 2, 139 n. 5, 141 n. 6, 153 n. 2). Hartmann also deals with this problem (5 n. 8, 10 n. 30, 14-15 n. 47, 27, 29 n. 92, 38 n. 25); for the meanings of such pivotal terms such as consciousness (four interpretations), the being-for-itself (two interpretations), and the in-itself (two interpretations), see Hartmann 44, 68, 87; see also 134. Naess observes: “Sometimes Sartre seems to be a slave to his own complicated terminology” (298 n. 42); see also the interesting observations on Sartre’s terms on 303 and 358. Barnes touches on the meaning of the being-for-itself (Sartre 53-54) and discusses three characteristics of consciousness (55-65). See also Spiegelberg (2nd ed. 2: 491).

23 See Hartmann xvi, 5 n. 8, 6 n. 12, 10 n. 29, 11 n. 33, 21 n. 59, 22 n. 63. One of the striking examples of how Sartre reshapes terms is the way he borrows Hegel’s definition of time and uses it, with a quite different meaning, in his definition of human reality or consciousness: “Sie [die Zeit] ist das Seyn, das, indem es ist, nicht ist, und indem es nicht ist, ist” (Hegel, Enzyklopädie § 258, 20: 247); compare with Sartre’s: human reality or consciousness “is what it is not and which is not what it is” (BN 63, 74); see Hartmann’s comments on this case (94-95). Naess (280, 292-93) points out some cases in which Sartre translates Heidegger’s terms into French. See also Fry 63 n. 77, 112, etc. Spiegelberg, as mentioned, deals predominantly with the similarities and differences in the phenomenology of Sartre, on the one hand, and Husserl and Heidegger, on the other (2nd ed. 2: 445-515).

24 Catalano, for instance, translates “est été” as “brought-to-be” rather than “made-to-be” which is Barnes’ (and Hartmann’s) version. Catalano (68 n. 7, 189 n. 3, 198 n. 1) also points out other examples of unconvincing translations. Hartmann provides several examples of incorrect translations of “est été” (64 n. 16; see also 21 n. 58, 35 n. 5, 62 n. 6, 88 n. 100). Naess in his quotes from Sartre often uses, within the same quote, more than one translation. Manser (Preface, 45-46, 118 n. 1) prefers to make his own translations. See also Fry 11 n. 27. The third section of the chapter on temporality in BN, “Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection,” is plagued by the difficulties in the translation of the key terms “reflection,” “reflective,” “reflected-on,” etc. (BN 151 n. 8).

25 Catalano writes: “Strictly speaking, being-in-itself is not an in-itself because it totally lacks selfhood” (97 n. 2). See also Hartmann 22 n. 62. Naess (290-91 n. 33, 300, 300 n. 44) makes interesting observations on Sartre’s terms.

26 At this point Sartre’s initial overcoming of the ontological paradox of time—namely, that time has no being and time has being—reminds us of Augustine’s provisional solution of the same aporia. To the skeptical argument that time has no being Augustine opposes the argument that we speak in positive and meaningful terms of the being of time (Ricoeur, Time 1: 7). Sartre refers to the use of language in this way: “Thus the particular tenses of the perfect indicate beings who all really exist although in diverse modes of being, but of which the one is and at the same time was the other” (BN 112). See also Sartre’s analysis of the expression “‘to have’ a past” and its substitution by “‘to be’ its own past” (112-14), especially assertions such as “the term ‘was’ is a mode of being” (114); for language as a proof of the being of time, see also 110-14. In the section on the past, the present, and the future, Sartre time and again makes use of aphorisms, common sayings, etc., i.e., of inherited wisdom about time fixed in language. The section on the ontology of temporality is based on a common verbal agreement: “Temporality is often considered as an indefinable. Everybody admits however that it is before all else a succession” (130). Sartre’s positive thesis of duration is implicitly based on the tense system of language (144-45). Catalano (123-24), by means of his examples, makes this implicit connection between the being of the duration and the verbal tenses explicit.


28 And yet, Sartre is not easy to pin down, for the general and the particular future are intermingled, and “myself” and “I” are interchangeable with “the Self” as it is in this important passage: “The Future is the ideal point where the sudden infinite compression of facticity (Past), of the For-itself (Present), and of its possible (a particular Future) will at last cause the Self to arise as the existence in-itself of the For-itself. The project of the For-itself toward the future which it is is a project toward the In-itself” (BN 128). Here one should note the strange combination “a particular Future,” the small letter of “future” in the second sentence, and the transition from a capital to small letter in the case of in-itself in the first and in the second sentence. One could say, in general, that if Sartre’s usage of capital and small letters in the section on the three temporal dimensions highlights the notions of the universal and the concrete past, present, and future, this usage is
inconsistent. When speaking of the past and the present, Sartre prefers the small letters for the for-itself, the in-itself, the past, and the present, whereas in the part devoted to the future, Sartre, as a whole, switches to capital letters.

In this case, I prefer again to follow Sartre’s logic and not the arrangement of his arguments. In fact, this second case originally comes after Sartre’s first positive description of the internal connection between A and B in \textit{BN} 132.

Cf.: “In both cases [Descartes’ and Kant’s] it is a temporal (God or ‘I’) which is charged with providing the non-temporals (instants) with their temporality. Temporality becomes a simple external and abstract relation between non-temporal substances; there is an attempt to reconstruct it entirely with a-temporal materials” (\textit{BN} 133). Or: “In a word, how could a being with a-temporal structure apprehend as temporals (or intend as such) in-itselfs isolated in their non-temporality? Thus inasmuch as temporality is at once a form of separation and a form of synthesis, it does not allow itself either to be derived from a non-temporality or to be imposed from without upon non-temporals” (\textit{BN} 134).

It seems that in criticizing the theory of the temporally ubiquitous witness Sartre again is in the tradition of Augustine who considers this problem when he thinks of the relation between time and eternity (cf. Ricoeur, \textit{Time} 1: 22-30).

In seeing the present as the unity of the three ekstases Sartre, opposing Heidegger’s stress on the future, joins the tradition of Augustine for whom the distention of the soul (\textit{distentio animi}) brings the three temporal dimensions into the present (cf. Ricoeur, \textit{Time} 1: 16-22).

Macann, as pointed out in note 4, is skeptical about Sartre’s theory of temporality as a whole. His criticism is particularly strong in respect to the dynamic of temporality and crystallizes in the question: “How can change be a characteristic of the For-itself if there is no place in Sartre’s analyses for the category of becoming?” (\textit{Four Phenomenological Philosophers} 136).

For Catalano, the difficult reading of this section is due to “the arrangement of tenses and long sentences” (123). In connection with this assertion, Macann skeptically asks: “But is a succession of negations (not this, not this, not this) really so different from a succession of instants (this, this, this)?” (\textit{Four Phenomenological Philosophers} 136).

The psychic duration, says Sartre, occurs when I feel the flow of time, apprehend myself as a unity of succession, and as a result, am conscious of enduring (\textit{BN} 150).

“Pure reflection, the simple presence of the reflective for-itself to the for-itself reflected-on, is at once the original form of reflection and its ideal form; it is that on whose foundation impure reflection appears, it is that also which is never first \textit{given}; and it is that which must be won by a sort of katharsis. Impure or accessory reflection [. . .] includes pure reflection but surpasses it and makes further claims” (\textit{BN} 155).

Barnes seems not to connect Sartre’s historicity to Heidegger’s \textit{Geschichtlichkeit}, for she derives the English “historicizes itself” directly from the French \textit{s’historialise} (\textit{BN} 158 n. 11).

Catalano writes of the ego in this way: “This ego cannot be consciousness because it is present to consciousness as an object to be studied and does not have the perfect transluency of consciousness” (109; Catalano’s emphasis).

It seems that in the opposition of psychic temporality and original temporality Sartre follows, once again, in the footsteps of Augustine’s theory of time. Ricoeur distinguishes two modes of time in Augustine’s (and in his, Ricoeur’s) temporal theory in general: first, objective, linear, physical time which can be compared to Sartre’s psychic temporality based on the in-itself (or, to be more accurate, it is our \textit{perception} of objective time which is Sartre’s psychic time); and second, subjective, existential, phenomenological time (presented in Augustine by the notion of \textit{distentio animi}) which reminds one of Sartre’s original temporality based in the for-itself (see Ricoeur, \textit{Time} 1: 5-30; and Ricoeur, “Narrative Time”).

The simplest and most radical operation in such deplorable “philosophical readings” of literature is to use the editorial scissors to get rid of these parts of the literary work that are “superfluous” in respect of certain “pure” philosophical ideas. This is the approach of Kaufmann (53), for instance, who cuts off the whole second part of Dostoevsky’s “Notes from the Underground” as well as the conclusion of the first part.
Works Cited


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